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L'11 agosto, Adam Bies ha effettuato l'accesso al suo account su Gab e ha iniziato a digitare:
"Credo sinceramente che se lavori per l'FBI, allora meriti di MORIRE."
Bies, 46 anni, era un aspirante fotografo freelance che aveva riempito il suo sito web di foto d'azione di auto veloci e sport all'aria aperta. Era stato licenziato dal suo lavoro quotidiano nel marketing per aver rifiutato il vaccino contro il COVID-19, ha scritto online, e aveva lottato nei suoi sforzi per presentare una domanda di disoccupazione.
Come i pubblici ministeri federali avrebbero poi descritto nei documenti del tribunale, Bies stava riempiendo le sue giornate pubblicando sotto uno pseudonimo su Gab, un servizio di social media popolare tra gli estremisti di destra.
Il suo post includeva un collegamento a una storia di Fox News sul direttore dell'FBI Christopher Wray che denunciava l'ondata di minacce violente dirette all'agenzia nei tre giorni dalla perquisizione della casa e del club dell'ex presidente Donald Trump, Mar-a-Lago. Paragonò gli agenti federali alle forze naziste. Era furioso per la "feccia dello stato di polizia". E ha composto quello che poteva essere visto come un piano finale.
"So già che morirò per mano di questi... stronzi delle forze dell'ordine", scrisse, inframmezzato da parolacce. "Il mio unico obiettivo è ucciderne altri prima che cadano."
Quattro giorni dopo, mandato in mano, agenti federali armati e squadre SWAT hanno circondato la casa di Bies, vicino a una cascata cadente nel paese di caccia nelle foreste profonde della Pennsylvania occidentale. All'interno della casa c'erano Bies e suo figlio di 12 anni. Era buio, quasi mezzanotte.
Gli agenti hanno chiamato Bies sul suo cellulare, ancora e ancora, 16 volte in tutto. Hanno impartito l'ordine di arrendersi tramite un altoparlante.
Alla fine, Bies emerse, portando un fucile d'assalto. Gli agenti gli hanno ordinato di deporre l'arma.
In quei quattro giorni tra i messaggi minacciosi di Bies e il momento in cui ha affrontato agenti armati, era stato catturato da una pratica complessa e poco conosciuta all'interno dell'FBI chiamata sfruttamento dei social media, o SOMEX, che potrebbe, in questo momento, monitorare le attività online di chiunque in America.
I massimi leader dell'FBI hanno cercato di minimizzare la misura in cui gli agenti possono monitorare legalmente le attività pubbliche online di persone che non sono indagate. Ma in realtà, l'FBI può condurre un monitoraggio quasi illimitato dei social media rivolti al pubblico, purché lo faccia per scopi di polizia, hanno detto a US TODAY i funzionari dell'FBI.
Gli esperti affermano che ciò conferisce all'FBI più potere di quanto fosse disposto a riconoscere pubblicamente:il potere dell'ufficio e altri esperti di sicurezza affermano di avere la responsabilità di utilizzare per prevenire il terrorismo.
Ma i critici affermano che lo sfruttamento dei social media significa anche che gli agenti possono rivedere i post online a piacimento, senza supervisione, ma con vaste autorità.
"I funzionari dell'FBI hanno diffuso molte informazioni errate sulla portata delle loro autorità", ha affermato Michael German, un ex agente speciale dell'FBI e membro del Brennan Center for Justice della New York University. "L'FBI ha poteri straordinari per indagare molto prima che si crei un ragionevole presupposto criminale."
SOMEX, coinvolge agenti che sviluppano i propri contatti e ricevono informazioni da una rete di appaltatori e collaboratori, come un gruppo di ricerca sul terrorismo che per primo ha segnalato i post di Bies.
Ma l'ufficio è stato criticato per come hanno reagito i suoi investigatori, come nel caso dei post online pubblicati da attivisti liberali durante le proteste di Black Lives Matter del 2020, e per come non hanno reagito, come nella formazione di destra per l'insurrezione del 6 gennaio.
L'FBI è stata a lungo sotto controllo per aver creato file su personaggi pubblici e altri, anche se non erano oggetto di indagine penale. E alcuni esperti affermano che l'agenzia ha una storia di concentrarsi su gruppi di sinistra come ambientalisti e attivisti per la giustizia razziale, ignorando le minacce dei suprematisti bianchi e altri a destra. Dicono che questa tendenza si trasferisca nell'era digitale.
E i documenti interni ottenuti da un gruppo di difesa sembrano mostrare agenti nella ricerca informatica che si concentrano specificamente su manifestazioni contro la polizia e la giustizia razziale invece che contro manifestanti armati o suprematisti bianchi.
"Il problema con la sorveglianza dei social media è spesso il problema con la polizia in generale, ovvero che la polizia non può prevedere il crimine, tutto ciò che può fare è fare una valutazione del tipo di persona che ha maggiori probabilità di commettere un crimine e mettere quel gruppo sotto sorveglianza ", ha affermato Matthew Guariglia, analista politico presso la Electronic Frontier Foundation. Quella "reazione istintiva", ha detto Guariglia, finisce per significare più sorveglianza e molestie nei confronti delle persone di colore e dei gruppi emarginati.
Ma poiché l'indignazione per Mar-a-Lago ora spinge le minacce degli estremisti di destra a livelli storici, le domande di vecchia data su come l'FBI monitora davvero gli americani online incontrano una nuova svolta:cosa succede quando le persone minacciate sono gli stessi agenti dell'FBI?
L'FBI ha un margine di manovra più ampio di quanto molti credano
Nel giugno dello scorso anno, in un'audizione della Commissione della Camera per la supervisione e la riforma, la deputata di New York Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez ha criticato Wray sull'incapacità dell'FBI di prevedere il caos dell'insurrezione del 6 gennaio.
"Ora sappiamo che gli attacchi sono stati pianificati allo scoperto su piattaforme di social media popolari", ha detto Ocasio-Cortez. "L'FBI include regolarmente il monitoraggio dei social media come parte dei suoi sforzi per combattere l'estremismo violento?"
La risposta di Wray è stata enfatica:
"Abbiamo politiche molto specifiche che sono state nel dipartimento per molto tempo che regolano la nostra capacità di utilizzare i social media. E quando abbiamo uno scopo autorizzato e una predicazione adeguata, ci sono molte cose che possiamo fare sui social media", ha detto Wray . "Ma quello che non possiamo fare sui social media è senza un'adeguata predicazione e uno scopo autorizzato, basta monitorare."
Mesi prima, l'ex vicedirettore esecutivo per la sicurezza nazionale dell'FBI, Jill Sanborn, ha fornito una spiegazione simile alla commissione del Senato per la sicurezza interna e gli affari governativi. "Non possiamo raccogliere attività protette dal Primo Emendamento senza una sorta di passaggio successivo, che è l'intento", ha affermato.
Il senatore Kyrsten Sinema ha proseguito chiedendo:"Quindi l'FBI non controlla le conversazioni sui social media pubblicamente disponibili?"
"Esatto, signora. Non rientra nelle nostre autorità", ha risposto Sanborn.
Le stesse regole dell'FBI dicono il contrario.
Funzionari dell'FBI hanno detto a US TODAY che la dichiarazione di Wray era corretta, pur riconoscendo che uno "scopo autorizzato" significa semplicemente fare qualsiasi cosa in linea con i doveri di un agente dell'FBI.
Tale "scopo autorizzato" è in realtà straordinariamente ampio. La politica vieterebbe agli agenti di guardare i social media, ad esempio, per tenere d'occhio un partner romantico o monitorare per qualche altro uso non da parte delle forze dell'ordine. Ma consentirebbe a un agente di guardare essenzialmente qualsiasi cosa online, in modo proattivo, se l'intento era fermare un crimine o proteggere gli americani. Un funzionario dell'FBI ha definito questo fatto rientrare nella "penombra della sicurezza nazionale, dell'applicazione della legge federale o dell'intelligence straniera".
German, a fellow with the Brennan Center's Liberty and National Security Program, argued in a recent report that individual FBI agents have extraordinary leeway to look through public-facing social media posts without seeking authorization from their superiors in advance or even keeping an official record of their actions.
The FBI rules, laid out in their handbook and periodically updated Attorney General's guidelines, allow agents to conduct "pre-assessments" of possible threats, German said. Those pre-assessments can be conducted "without any factual basis to suspect wrongdoing," German writes in his report.
He and several other experts agree that the FBI certainly can, then, proactively monitor Americans' social media for signs of unrest, dissent or violence that might lead to criminal activity.
FBI officials told U.S. TODAY this is correct. There's no need for "proper predication," or evidence of a crime, when conducting a pre-assessment of a subject.
German's analysis of the rules was echoed by Brian Murphy, a former top FBI official who helped pioneer the FBI's social media exploitation efforts.
He cited Sanborn's statements, telling U.S. TODAY, "I just think that she was wrong." He said the agency has a risk-averse culture that prevents agents and managers from taking the steps necessary to fully protect Americans.
Sanborn, who is no longer at the FBI, did not respond to messages seeking comment. An FBI spokesperson said Sanborn's comments referred specifically to "conversations" on social media and not to public-facing posts by individuals.
While the bureau describes its authorities carefully, its agents—and third party contractors—can track critics of the government like Adam Bies, watching until their online rantings cross a line into outright threats.
Then the FBI can act.
What SOMEX really looks for
The FBI's SOMEX team, which sits within the agency's National Threat Operations Center in Clarksburg, West Virginia, receives and investigates tips on imminent social media threats from concerned citizens, other law enforcement agencies, independent monitoring organizations and others.
But the effort involves more than just acting as a catcher's mitt for incoming tips. It also develops its own social media intelligence.
Documents obtained by the open-government group Property of the People (and first reported by Rolling Stone) give insight into the broader social media monitoring role SOMEX plays inside the FBI. The documents detail reports from the team to federal and local law enforcement in the Seattle area during the civil unrest that unfolded in the wake of the murder of George Floyd.
"While overnight social media activity was very light, the SOMEX team did find some tweeting by individuals stating they would monitor police radio activity," reads a typical extract from the documents, taken from a June 2, 2020 situation report emailed to dozens of FBI agents.
"The FBI aggressively scours social media for information related to topics of Bureau interest," said Ryan Shapiro, executive director and co-founder of the nonprofit group, which provided U.S. TODAY with hundreds of pages of documents about the FBI's social media monitoring that it acquired through open records requests. "This routinely includes surveillance of Americans who are not the subject of an investigation or even suspected of committing a crime."
In a statement, the FBI said that SOMEX was created to assist in identifying "unknown subject, victim, or location information" when there's a threat to life by using publicly available information. The team then forwards information to the appropriate agency for further investigation and appropriate action.
FBI officials told U.S. TODAY that agents are not allowed to use specific SOMEX tools without additional training in privacy and civil liberties protections. Those tools include commercial software the FBI purchases to use in-house. The FBI also works with third-party contractors for social media analysis, the officials said.
One contractor is the private intelligence firm the Hetherington Group, which has trained law enforcement and the military on conducting online investigations.
Cynthia Hetherington, the firm's founder and president, said the company identifies "actionable intelligence" that can be used to protect life or someone's reputation by helping those it trains learn how to hyperfocus and efficiently identify a key collection of terms that demonstrate legitimate threats, such as "kill," "die," "shoot," "fire," "bomb," "rob."
"Individuals should be allowed to say what they want to say on the internet, but should also understand that it's open source and the parties concerned will trace it back" to them, Hetherington said.
Another way of saying that, said Shapiro, who holds a doctorate from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology focusing on government surveillance, is that the FBI can, and is, monitoring practically whoever it wants, whenever it wants.
"The FBI is almost entirely unhindered in its ability to monitor American social media postings," Shapiro said, "So when the FBI reported to Congress that it was unable to do so—I mean, that is a bald-faced lie. That's what the bureau does. They lie."
As the FBI becomes more interested in specific posts, the bureau can also ramp up its monitoring in more "intrusive" ways, FBI officials said. With additional internal approvals, FBI agents can access not just public-facing social media, but also private groups and chat rooms.
Even when accessing this more private information, the FBI's internal checks don't protect Americans' civil liberties, several experts told U.S. TODAY.
The FBI has a long and troubled history of focusing on groups on the left of the political spectrum while largely turning a blind eye to domestic extremists on the far-right, said Guariglia, who holds a doctorate in the history of police surveillance.
"Both historically speaking, and in current events, we've seen the amount of surveillance that has been marshaled specifically against groups fighting for racial justice increased exponentially than from what we've seen being monitored on the right," Guariglia said.
The FBI pushed back on this assessment. "The FBI aggressively investigates threats posed by domestic violent extremists," a bureau spokesperson wrote in a statement. "We do not investigate ideology and we do not investigate particular cases based on the political views of the individuals involved."
Are there enough resources to do the work?
The FBI isn't the only law enforcement agency doing social media exploitation.
The bureau's SOMEX team is part of a constellation of social media analysis that has occurred across the national security apparatus over the few years. The Department of Homeland Security has its own SOMEX team plus social media analysts at dozens of "fusion centers" across the U.S. sharing intelligence with local, state and federal law enforcement, said Mike Sena, executive director of one of those fusion centers, the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center.
The FBI also works to train and assist local police departments in their social media exploitation efforts, a tactic that came to light earlier this year in a report by the Intercept, which detailed how the bureau provided the Chicago Police Department with fake social media accounts to investigate demonstrators outraged at the Floyd murder by police officers in 2020.
The San Bernardino terrorist attack in 2015 turned out to be a "proof of concept" on the efficacy of social media analysis, Hetherington said, when reporting from Facebook to a fusion center social media analyst helped the FBI quickly identify the people involved.
But using social media analysis to identify future crimes, rather than research past ones, is a broader net. That federal effort to prevent crimes is still small given the scale of the internet, Sena said.
"Most people would be shocked in America," Sena said. "There's a small number of folks trying to deal with these threats that are huge."
Sena and Hetherington told U.S. TODAY that after the ACLU of California publicized law enforcement's use of commercial software to "monitor activists and protesters" in 2016, many companies stopped selling their software to law enforcement or minimized their capacity to use it to track online activity.
As a result, Sena said, "our people are manually doing things, they're doing the work, but they're having to work 10 times as hard as they used to."
That's why agencies plan to bring their teams together, at least virtually, to break up siloes and avoid duplication, Sena said. One byproduct of this effort, he said, will be fewer blindspots or gaps that can be used to accuse law enforcement of bias.
"Even if you're being proactive, it's basically walking with a teaspoon at a river and trying to put that in a bucket," Sena said. "We're not getting everything, but it's better than nothing."
But German argues in his report that the majority of social media exploitation work is actually counterproductive. The sheer volume of tips generated by contractors and the FBI's own analysts results in an "information overload," German writes.
"Obviously, the multiple forms of social media monitoring that the FBI and other law enforcement agencies conducted prior to January 6 was not helpful in preparing for the attack," the report states. "Yet after the Capitol insurrection, the FBI invested an additional $27 million into social media monitoring software, effectively doubling down on a failed methodology."
Ongoing investment in social media exploitation
Those efforts continue even in the weeks since the Mar-a-Lago search and backlash.
Three days after the FBI executed its Aug. 8 search warrant on Mar-a-Lago and was inundated by right-wing threats, Ricky Shiffer, a 42-year-old Navy veteran, walked into the FBI office in Cincinnati armed with a nail gun and an AR-15 rifle.
As U.S. TODAY reported, Shiffer had spent the last nine days of his life ranting on Truth Social, the social media company founded by Trump. His hundreds of posts included explicit threats against the federal government including "Kill F.B.I. on sight."
When his attack failed, Shiffer fled north along rural highways and into a standoff where was ultimately shot and killed.
The FBI said in a statement that it had been informed of Shiffer but that "the information did not contain a specific and credible threat."
Wray told the agency in a message the day after that attack that the FBI's security division would be adjusting its "security posture accordingly."
A $32,400 contract approved Monday—after discussion that started weeks before the search of Mar-a-Lago, Hetherington said—notes that the agency will hire the Hetherington Group to train its agents on SOMEX later this month.
According to a document the bureau filed to justify making the purchase without opening it up to bidding, "it is an immediate need to expand and broaden the social media knowledge for the NTOS SOMEX team." The FBI wrote that the training can provide it with expertise in the "forces and factors that lead to the radicalization of terrorism specifically white supremacy extremism."
That document was filed Aug. 11, the same day Shiffer carried a nail gun into an FBI office, then fled into the Ohio cornfields.
It was also the same day Adam Bies was logging post after post on Gab.
'Why don't you send them my threats'
As Bies tapped out his messages, he wasn't just speaking to his 1,600 followers. According to court documents, he also deliberately tagged Gab founder Andrew Torba in his posts, goading him to report Bies to the federal government.
"Why don't you send them my threats so that they'd at least have something credible to show on Fox News," Bies wrote in the post. "Just scrub my timeline for the posts you didn't delete after you threatened to ban me."
Also watching Bies' posts was a third-party media monitoring and analysis firm, the Middle East Media Research Institute. MEMRI cut its teeth monitoring Middle Eastern media for English-speaking audiences, but over the last three years has expanded to real-time social media monitoring, specifically for threats from white supremacists and other homegrown extremists.
"We're consistently in communication with (law enforcement and government) agencies at the local, state and national level, and providing" them with actionable intelligence, said Simon Purdue, director of MEMRI's Domestic Terror Threat Monitor team. "Having people like us helps speed things along."
MEMRI alerted the FBI, according to a later criminal complaint. The FBI contacted Gab, who handed over Bies' subscriber information and Internet Protocol logs for his computer connection. Soon, agents were outside his Mercer County home.
After a 30 or 40 minute stand-off at his home, Bies eventually emerged carrying an assault rifle, an FBI agent testified in court. Agents told him several times to drop the weapon, which he eventually did.
Had he not done so, the agent testified, according to local media reports, "It would have ended differently."
Bies' son left the house safely. Inside the home, agents found 12 other guns and a compound bow. Bies was taken into custody and charged under a law that covers making threats against a federal law enforcement officer.
He has pleaded not guilty and is being held awaiting trial. + Esplora ulteriormente
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