Credito:Wikimedia Commons
Come ricercatore, Ho seguito vari gruppi e movimenti di estrema destra in Norvegia e Scandinavia negli ultimi 30 anni. Ci sono stati alcuni cambiamenti significativi durante questo periodo - cambiamenti che hanno un impatto su come la nostra società dovrebbe relazionarsi a tali ambienti, e quali tipi di misure preventive potrebbero essere pertinenti ed efficaci.
Primo, cosa intendiamo con concetti come estremismo di destra? Nella ricerca sulla cosiddetta estrema destra, è ampiamente accettato tra gli studiosi fare una distinzione tra la destra radicale e l'estrema destra. Condividono una qualche forma di nativismo o nazionalismo etnico, nonché l'intolleranza verso la diversità. Però, gli attori della destra radicale operano all'interno dei confini democratici, considerando che gli attori di estrema destra rifiutano apertamente la democrazia e i diritti umani universali, e considerano legittima la violenza contro i "nemici del popolo".
Le culture giovanili razziste sono sparite
Uno degli sviluppi più sorprendenti in Norvegia e in molti altri paesi è che l'estremismo di destra non è più un tipico problema giovanile, ma piuttosto tali organizzazioni e movimenti sono ormai costituiti quasi esclusivamente da adulti. Durante gli anni '90 e l'inizio degli anni 2000 c'erano alcune sottoculture e gruppi giovanili di estrema destra piuttosto grandi in Norvegia e in altri paesi occidentali. Questi movimenti erano principalmente associati alla sottocultura skinhead (in Norvegia rappresentata da gruppi come Boot Boys), così come band e concerti di musica del potere bianco, e organizzazioni neonaziste che si rivolgevano ad alcuni giovani emarginati e vulnerabili (ad esempio Vigrid). La maggior parte dei partecipanti è stata reclutata in queste scene da adolescenti, i gruppi stessi che soddisfano alcuni bisogni sociali fondamentali come l'amicizia, identità, protezione, entusiasmo e appartenenza al gruppo. Nel movimento skinhead in particolare, violenza e odio contro gli oppositori, immigrati, e altri gruppi emarginati avevano un valore di per sé. Il loro stile visivo era facilmente riconoscibile in strada, che spesso sfociava in violenti scontri con gli avversari, come militanti di sinistra e antifascisti.
Oggi in Norvegia non ci sono quasi più scene giovanili di estrema destra o razziste. Non ci sono arene sociali attraenti che possono attirare i giovani in movimenti di estrema destra o razzisti, e nemmeno c'è una scena musicale White Power, come c'era negli anni '90. La principale organizzazione neonazista, il Movimento di Resistenza Nordico, ha circa 30-40 attivisti in Norvegia, forse 4-500 in Svezia, e circa 100 in Finlandia e Danimarca. Però, i membri di questa organizzazione sono adulti, tipicamente tra i 20 e i 50 anni, e almeno in Norvegia, non ci sono quasi adolescenti. Apparentemente, le regole e lo stile di vita molto rigidi del gruppo non sembrano piacere a molti giovani. L'ideologia nazionalsocialista sembra superata.
Gruppi di vigilanti come i Soldati di Odino erano principalmente una comunità di alcuni giovani uomini e poche donne tra i 20 e i 40 anni, piuttosto che un gruppo attraente per gli adolescenti. Identità Generazionale, un movimento etno-nazionalista che è riuscito a reclutare studenti e altri giovani intraprendenti in alcuni paesi europei, non è ancora stato in grado di ottenere alcun punto d'appoggio significativo in Norvegia. Però, questo è probabilmente il tipo di movimento di estrema destra che potrebbe avere un potenziale per reclutare tra i giovani norvegesi.
Organizzazioni di destra radicale contro l'immigrazione e l'islamizzazione, come Stop all'islamizzazione di Norvegia/Danimarca/Europa, Pegida e la lega di difesa inglese/norvegese, il Movimento Popolare contro l'Immigrazione (FMI) e un partito chiamato "I Democratici", tipicamente sono costituiti da adulti e anziani, ma non c'è quasi nessun giovane da vedere in queste organizzazioni.
Una delle ragioni principali di questo allontanamento dall'estremismo di destra tra i giovani è che la paura degli stranieri – la xenofobia – è stata gradualmente ridotta tra le giovani generazioni in Norvegia. Diverse indagini attitudinali hanno dimostrato che la xenofobia è principalmente mantenuta tra le generazioni più anziane. I giovani di oggi crescono in una società multiculturale, e sono abituati a compagni di scuola e amici di diversa cultura, origini religiose e razziali. Non è lo stesso con le persone anziane, che sono molto più preoccupati dai volti e dalle culture "straniere".
Questo cambiamento ha importanti conseguenze su come prevenire l'estremismo di destra, e quali agenzie dispongono delle risorse e delle misure necessarie per farlo. Quando il gruppo target per la prevenzione negli anni '90 e nei primi anni 2000 erano principalmente adolescenti, nei comuni esisteva un ampio apparato di prevenzione incentrato sui bambini e sui giovani:il sistema scolastico, ad esempio, ha gli insegnanti incaricati di seguire gli alunni con vari problemi e gli alunni che hanno abbandonato la scuola. C'erano le infermiere della scuola, operatori giovanili, squadre psico-sociali per i giovani, servizi di protezione dell'infanzia, circoli giovanili, società sportive e altre attività del tempo libero. Vi è stata anche una stretta collaborazione tra polizia preventiva, scuole e servizi sociali per seguire i giovani a rischio o coinvolti nella droga, bande, violenza o estremismo. Tutti questi servizi e misure preventive – elementi fondamentali nello stato sociale scandinavo – sono irrilevanti quando il gruppo target non sono più gli adolescenti ma i giovani adulti o gli anziani dai 18 agli 80 anni. Sono necessari nuovi approcci e devono essere coinvolti altri attori e agenzie. Il Servizio Penitenziario (servizio penitenziario), il servizio per l'impiego e i vari servizi sanitari sono attori importanti nel trattare con questi militanti adulti, although the police and the security service will play a major role in preventing these adult activists from committing crimes, and follow them up with more repressive measures if they do.
From street activism to internet activism – and back to the street?
Another significant change during the last decades is that the arenas for extremist activism to a large extent – but not completely – have moved from physical meetings and street activism onto the Internet in the forms of web pages, blogs and various types of social media (such as Facebook, Twitter, Youtube, Telegram, etc).
This change has several consequences:the threshold for participating in discussions and exchange of opinions has become lower. It is also much easier to find people sharing your particular views on the Internet than in traditional social arenas. In discussion fora at Facebook or other social media you can get your radical views confirmed and reinforced through interaction with likeminded peers, leading to a radicalisation of your own worldview. The threshold is lower for expressing extremist attitudes or making hateful or threatening statements. The increase in hate speech and threats against politicians that has been measured is several studies during the last few years is mainly reflecting an increase in such statements in social media. Such hate speech and threats may become so stressful and frightening that some top politicians have considered giving up their political positions and public engagement activities.
Another reason for the increase in extreme-right activism on the Internet is that the risk to participate in such activities is much lower in on-line activism than in off-line activities. There is little risk for being physically attacked by militant anti-racists. Infatti, more broadly, when extremist activism is mainly taking place in the virtual space there are fewer opportunities for physical and violent clashes with political opponents. The experience from Norway during the 1990s and early 2000s was that such confrontations could have radicalising impact on both sides and cause a spiral of violence. In Norway, this form of violent conflict dynamics has been relatively absent during the last 15 years. Hate crime in the form of violence, harassment and threats does still happen in the physical space but most of this aggression and hatred is now coming out as hate speech and harassment in social media. Because the threshold for making such hateful statements has been lowered, the volume of it has also increased. When my colleague Jacob Aasland Ravndal in his Ph.D. thesis finds that the number of right-wing extremist attacks in Western Europe has been reduced in the period between 1990 and 2015, one of the possible explanations he provides is that a large part of extremist political activism has moved from the physical space to on-line activism.
Però, street activism has not ended completely, and some far-right and extreme-right groups have even re-invigorated their street-level activity. Some anti-Islam groups have had a number of street stands to propagate their message, although with limited participation. In molti casi, their talks have been drowned out by shouting from counter-demonstrators. There have also been two main attempts to mobilise mass demonstrations against immigration and Islam, but both failed. The English Defence League, which has mobilised thousands in the UK, inspired the Norwegian Defence League, but the turn-out was very low. The same happened with the Norwegian off-shoot of the German Pegida movement, which mobilised tens of thousands in cities like Dresden in Germany. Their Norwegian subsidiary got some attention initially, but it soon petered out.
Però, the Nordic Resistance Movement has succeeded in organising some rather large street demonstrations, in particular in Sweden, with up to 500 participants marching with flags, uniforms and shields. In Norway they have only managed to mobilise 70 and 50 participants in two demonstrations, and the majority of the demonstrators were Swedish activists, not Norwegians. Però, what makes the demonstrations of the Norwegian Resistance Movement more powerful and scary than their limited numbers should entail is that they act in a very disciplined way, almost in military order, with banners and uniforms. Previous Norwegian neo-Nazis have never been able to act like that, even if the Norwegian branch of the Nordic Resistance movement could not have done this without a lot of support from their Swedish partners.
The Nordic Resistance Movement claims that violence will be necessary to achieve their revolution but they do not consider it strategically useful to make use of it at this stage. Their rhetoric is very violent, anche se, carrying posters with pictures of politicians and others they claim are "traitors of the people" during their demonstrations, and also putting up posters saying that traitors shall be hanged. Però, they rarely initiate violent attacks against opponents, although they are ready to attack anyone who provoke them. In Finlandia, an activist kicked down a person who said something against the group. He died a few days later. The organisation has now been banned by the court in Finland. In Norway, però, the police cannot ban the Nordic Resistance Movement from staging marches and demonstrations as long as they operate within the boundaries of the law and the freedom of expression. In one case, the police banned their demonstration due to the risk of violent clashes with militant counter-demonstrators. This decision was strongly criticised by legal experts on human rights. Handling demonstrations by national socialists – declared enemies of democracy and human rights – is a dilemma the police will continue to face for the foreseeable future.
One of the consequences of activism transferring from the street to the web and social media is that most of the activism is no longer linked to a geographical location where there is an apparatus for prevention. That means that there is not necessarily any particular agency who feels responsible to intervene against hate speech or individuals who cross the line. In precedenza, the local police knew the individuals who had extremist inclinations. In the present situation, such individuals and incidents might be detected by or reported to central units in the police or security service – or not. These units may – or may not – send the cases to the local police and ask them to intervene. In Norway, the National Criminal Investigation Service has for some years had a so-called Net Patrol, but until now, they have not had the capacity to actively monitor the web and social media. It has mainly functioned as an Internet portal – a virtual police station – where people can report incidents. Beginning in January 2019, the National Criminal Investigation Service has set up a new centre for digital policing, tasked with doing more active patrolling on the net. The police do prosecute a number of cases of hate speech and threats made through social media, and there have been several convictions during the last few years. Many cases are in the grey area of legality, anche se. Però, the police has developed another measure that has proven to be quite effective:giving warnings and using preventive dialogue to make people change their behaviour, as well as using dialogue to assess whether there is a risk that the offender might actually do something more than making verbal threats.
Globalisation and transnational diffusion
Globalisation is not a new phenomenon when it comes to political extremism in general and right-wing extremism in particular. Militant ideologies and modes of action have spread from country to country and inspired new groups and generations, as evidenced by Italian fascism, German National Socialism, American racism and fascist skinhead culture from England. Però, previously, this travelling of extremist ideas, social movements and action forms happened rather slowly. It took almost a decade before the racist skinhead style took foothold among groups of youths in Norway, and more than a decade before it faded away.
During the last 10-15 years the diffusion of radical and extremist movements has accelerated amazingly. Concepts, names and action forms like PEGIDA, the English/Norwegian Defence League and the Soldiers of Odin took merely days or weeks from they emerged in Germany or Finland until an off-shoot was planted in Norway. Within a few months in 2016, Soldiers of Odin spread to more than 20 countries. Però, these off-shoots had a rapid growth before they dried out and disappeared. Apparentemente, they did not find a fertile ground and failed to set down roots.
The news media played a major role in the launching of these new, imported groups. When the Norwegian Defence League, Pegida and the Soldiers of Odin staged their first events, there were often more journalists than activists or demonstrators present, giving the upstarts a lot of publicity to start with.
The contrast to these rapid-growing but failed off-shoots was the Norwegian Resistance Movement, which was an off-shoot of the original Swedish Resistance Movement. Both the Swedish, Finnish and Norwegian branches have spent years to build a disciplined, hierarchical organisation with a solid stem of activists, chi, though small in number, are very dedicated.
Islam as the new main enemy
The organised opposition to immigration that emerged during the late 1980s with the establishment of the People's Movement against Immigration and similar organisations were, to begin with, a rather marginal and stigmatized movement. The movement was characterized by an extremist, rude rhetoric which justified violence against their opponents, described as "national traitors". During the last 15 years the general opposition against immigration has moved towards a more specific fight against Islam and immigration by Muslims. This skepticism against Islam is no longer mainly associated with marginal groupings but has now made inroads into the political mainstream. In the aftermath of the 9-11 attacks in the USA in 2001 and a series of lethal terrorist attacks in Europe during the following years, militant Islamism and jihadi terrorism now appears as a real threat to ordinary people in Norway as well as to the rest of Europe. Inoltre, many feel that conservative Islamist customs and dress codes have spread in ways that is challenging liberal Norwegian and European values and norms.
Another significant development is that some of the leading anti-Islam activists have a political background which is not from the far right but rather from the radical or liberal left, from anti-religious secularism and from the feminist movement. In contrast to the traditional anti-immigration movement, which often appeared as reactionary male chauvinists, many opponents of Islam today present themselves as defenders of women's liberation, gender equality and gay rights. For some of the anti-Islam activists, these are genuine liberal values, whereas others who voice these arguments appear more as opportunists in this regard. Però, within the anti-Islam movements, old-fashioned extreme-right attitudes live side-by-side with liberal and secular values.
The boundaries for what is acceptable to express publicly about Muslims and Islam has moved considerably during the previous 10-15 years. Much of what is said in the public, would not have been acceptable if one said "Jew" rather than "Muslim". Leading Norwegian politicians have made statements about a "sneaky islamisation of Norway" and similar statements that contributes to a normalization of claims that their political opponents have deliberately facilitated an Islamic "invasion" of Europe. A likely consequence of pointing out Islam as the new main enemy is that an increasing share of extreme-right violence and hate crime is now directed specifically against Muslims. In particolare, women wearing hijab or niqab have become victims of hateful harassment and violence. It is laudable that the Norwegian government has recently launched an action plan against anti-Semitism. Però, there is an even greater need for a preventive strategy against Islamophobia.